



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THE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

Vol. 9²

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH
UNDER THE EDITORSHIP

OF
[J. A. Smith and]
W. D. ROSS, M.A.

FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE

MAGNA MORALIA
ETHICA EUDEMI
DE VIRTUTIBUS ET VITIIS

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III

IN bringing out this part of the translation, I wish to acknowledge my many obligations to my fellow members of the Oxford Aristotelian Society. The Society has recently read the *Eudemian Ethics*, and while (owing to my occasional absence from the meetings) the translation has not profited as much by this as it might have done, yet I have been able to transmit to Mr. Solomon, and he has accepted, not a few readings and renderings which were suggested at meetings of the Society. Readings the authority for which is not given in the notes come as a rule from this source.

The introduction, the tables of contents, and the indices to the three works contained in this part have all been prepared by Mr. St. George Stock.

Mr. Stock and Mr. Solomon have for the most part rendered λόγος in the traditional way, as 'reason'. Personally I doubt whether this rendering is ever required, but the final choice in such a question rests with the translators.

W. D. ROSS.

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. The three moral treatises that go under the name of Aristotle present a problem somewhat analogous to that of the three Synoptic Gospels. All three used once to be ascribed to the direct authorship of Aristotle with the same simple-heartedness, or the same absence of reflection, with which all three Gospels used to be ascribed to the Holy Ghost. We may see that some advance, or at all events some movement, has been made in the Aristotelian problem, if we remember that it was once possible for so great a critic as Schleiermacher to maintain that the *Magna Moralia* was the original treatise from which the two others were derived. Nowadays the opinion of Spengel is generally accepted, namely, that the *Nicomachean Ethics* emanates directly from the mind of Aristotle himself, that the *Eudemian Ethics* contains the same matter recast by another hand, and that the *Magna Moralia* is the work of a later writer who had both the other treatises before him. Whether the three books which are common to the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* (*E. N.* v, vi, vii: *E. E.* iv, v, vi) proceed from the writer of the former or of the latter work is a point which is still under debate. To an Oxford man indeed who has been nurtured on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and to whom that treatise has become, mentally speaking, 'bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh', it seems too self-evident to require discussion that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the substance of which the others are the shadow. But this confidence may be born of prejudice, and it is possible that, if the same person had had the *Eudemian Ethics* equally carefully instilled into him in his youth, he might on making

acquaintance with the *Nicomachean* find nothing more in that than a less literary rearrangement of the *Eudemian*. There is no doubt a prejudice in favour of the familiar, which has to be guarded against, but we may encourage ourselves by remembering that the preference for the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not confined to Oxford, or to English or foreign Universities, or to modern times, since, as Grant points out, there have been many commentaries by Greek and Latin writers on the *Nicomachean*, but not one on the *Eudemian Ethics*. Herein we have an unconscious testimony to the superior value of the *Nicomachean* work.

§ 2. But why 'Nicomachean'? There is no certain tradition on this subject. Our earliest information is derived from the well-known passage in Cicero,¹ from which we gather that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was commonly ascribed to Aristotle himself, whereas Cicero thought that it might well have been written by his son Nicomachus. But what we are otherwise told about Nicomachus rather goes against this. Aristocles the Peripatetic, who is said to have been teacher to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, is thus quoted by Eusebius in his *Praeparatio Evangelica*, xv. 2 § 10: 'After the death of Pytheas, daughter of Hermeias, Aristotle married Epyllis of Stagira, by whom he had a son Nicomachus. He is said to have been brought up as an orphan in the house of Theophrastus and died, while a mere lad, in war.' On the other hand Diogenes Laertius at about the same date as Aristocles (A. D. 200) evidently shared Cicero's opinion that Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, wrote the work which bears his name.²

A different tradition, which appears in some of the commentators, is to the effect that Aristotle himself wrote three treatises on morals, one of which he addressed to his disciple Eudemus, another to his father Nicomachus, and yet a third to his son of the same name. The two latter

¹ *Fin.* v. § 12 'qua re teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patris similis esse filius.'

² D. L. viii. § 88 φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν (i. e. Eudoxus) Νικόμαχος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν. Cp. *E. N.* 1101^b 27 and 1172^b 9.

were distinguished from one another by the one addressed to the father being called 'the great Nicomacheans', while that addressed to the son was called 'the little Nicomacheans'.¹

That all three works were by Aristotle himself is assumed by Atticus the Platonist, who lived in the time of Marcus Aurelius, and who is the first writer to mention the *Magna Moralia*,² while the common authorship of the last-mentioned and of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is similarly assumed by the Scholiast on Plato, *Rep.* 495 E.³ It seems to be only by Aspasius in a note on *E.N.* viii. 8 that Eudemus is recognized as being himself the author of the treatise which bears his name.⁴

§ 3. Let us now inquire what is known about Eudemus. First of all he is called by Simplicius⁵ 'the most genuine among the followers of Aristotle', which may be taken to mean that he followed him most closely, as indeed we are expressly told elsewhere that of all the interpreters he was best acquainted with the mind of Aristotle. We are sometimes informed that Theophrastus deviated from Aristotle, but we never hear this of Eudemus. Then there is the charming story told by Aulus Gellius⁶ of how Aristotle elected his successor by indicating his preference for the wine of Lesbos over that of Rhodes. 'Both are good,' pronounced the philosopher after tasting them, 'but ἡδίων ὁ Λέσβιος'. It was clearly understood by all that the suavity of Theophrastus of Lesbos had been preferred to the more austere excellence of Eudemus of Rhodes.

Further we are told by Ammonius⁷ that 'the disciples of Aristotle, Eudemus and Phantias and Theophrastus, in

¹ Comm. Porphy. Prolegg. in Categ. Schol. in Arist. 9^b 20 sqq. : David in Cat. Schol. 25^a 40.

² Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xv. 4 § 6 Heinechen αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι, Εὐδήμιοι τε καὶ Νικομάχειοι καὶ μεγάλων ἡθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμενοι.

³ He points out that the contrary of μικροπρέπεια is called by Aristotle βαναυσία or ἀπειροκαλία in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but σαλακωνία ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις.

⁴ λέγει δὲ καὶ Εὐδήμος καὶ Θεόφραστος, ὅτι καὶ αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίας κτλ. See *E. E.* vii. 10 § 9, 1242^b 4.

⁵ Ar. *Phys.* fol. 93^b Εὐδήμος ὁ γνησιώτατος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων.

⁶ *N. A.* xiii. 5.

⁷ Brandis, *Scholia in Aristot.* p. 28, note.

rivalry with their master, wrote *Categories* and *On Interpretation* and *Analytics*'. As to *Categories* or *de Interpretatione* written by Eudemus nothing more seems to be known, but the following works at least are ascribed to him by ancient writers :—

On the Angle	(περὶ γωνίας).
Researches in Geometry . .	(γεωμετρικαὶ ἱστορίαι).
Researches in Arithmetic . .	(ἀριθμητικὴ ἱστορία).
Researches in Astronomy . .	(ἀστρολογικαὶ ἱστορίαι).
Analytics	(ἀναλυτικά).
On Diction	(περὶ λέξεως).
On Physics	(φυσικά). ¹

It would appear from this list that, apart from Ethics, the chief interest of Eudemus lay in Mathematics. But Fritzsche has made it appear probable that Eudemus of Rhodes is identical with the author of a work *On Animals*, which was used by Aelian, and also with the famous anatomist of the same name who is often mentioned by Galen. However this may be—and Fritzsche himself abstains from pronouncing judgement—the composition of his treatise on Physics was no mere by-work with Eudemus, for we know that while he was engaged on the task he wrote to Theophrastus to send him a correct copy of the fifth book of Aristotle's *Physics*, because his own copy was vitiated by clerical errors. It would be a boon to us if some later member of the School had taken the like care with regard to the *Eudemian Ethics*; for as the text of that work now stands a reader or translator has to conjecture his way through a great part of it. That the opinion of Eudemus on general questions of philosophy was held in high esteem appears from the statement made by the Greek commentators that Aristotle before publishing his *Metaphysics* sent the work to Eudemus, and that in consequence of some difficulties raised by him its publication was delayed, so that it did not appear until after the

¹ References for the above writings are given by Fritzsche in his edition of the *Eudemian Ethics*.

author's death. It is said that the appendix to Book I known as α' ἑλαττον was the work of Pasicles, the nephew of Eudemus, son of his brother Boethus.

§ 4. We turn now to the work known as the *Eudemian Ethics*. The first thing that must strike any one who reads it is its general resemblance to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This, following Grant, we may exhibit as follows:—

<i>E. E.</i> i, ii	=	<i>E. N.</i> i-iii. 5.
— iii	=	— iii. 6-end of iv.
— iv, v, vi	=	— v, vi, vii.
— vii	=	— viii, ix.
— viii new.		

Further we may notice that in both treatises there is first a scheme of the moral virtues with some brief remarks followed by a more detailed treatment of each of the virtues in particular. Both treatises also are in what may be called a half-baked state, presenting now the appearance of mere lecture-notes, now that of finished literary work. Thus in *E. E.* 1220^b 10 the words ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις may be a memorandum for personal guidance, which had a meaning for the author, but has none for us. The same explanation perhaps applies to 1218^a 36 τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον and to 1244^b 30, 31 ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται. In using the words ἐν τοῖς λόγοις in 1240^a 23, 1244^a 20 the writer may be referring to his own lectures, while in 1233^a 1, the words 'But there's left there' are suggestive of the lecturer pointing to some diagram which he has just set before the eyes of his class.

§ 5. Grant has noticed how the greater precision of statement which we sometimes find in *E. E.* as compared with *E. N.* is suggestive of a commentator improving on the original author. Instances of this may be seen in connexion with the Delian inscription (1214^a 1-6: *E. N.* 1299^a 24-29), the saying of Anaxagoras (1216^a 11-16: *E. N.* 1179^a 13), Heraclitus on anger (1223^b 22: *E. N.* 1105^a 8), Socrates on courage (1229^a 16, 1230^a 7: *E. N.* 1116^b 4), Philoxenus (1231^a 17).

§ 6. Another thing which tends to show that the *Eudemian*

Ethics is the later work is that while it creates an impression of less power than the *Nicomachean*, it at the same time presents a more developed form of doctrine. Thus the division of impulse (*ὁρεξις*) into its three species, which is latent in *E.N.*, becomes patent in *E.E.*¹

1123 Again the true nature of the *σώφρων* of *E.N.* 1223^b 5, or sober-minded man, who estimates himself at his true worth, comes out more clearly in *E.E.* 1233^a 16-25, where it appears that he is of the same nature as the man of great mind, who is in fact only a particular instance of sober-minded man, namely one whose merits happen to be superlative. Eudemus too is not content to enumerate the ways in which Happiness may conceivably be acquired, but adds some inducements to believe that the division is exhaustive.² He also states explicitly that Happiness must consist mainly in three things, Wisdom, Virtue, and Pleasure, which is only implied in *E.N.*³ Generally the connexion of moral virtue with pleasure and pain comes out more clearly in *E.E.* than in *E.N.*, inasmuch that this connexion is made to form part of the definition of moral virtue in *E.E.* (1227^b 5-10). The frank rejection also in *E.E.* of the Platonic ideas altogether as 'mere empty logical fictions' reflects weariness of a controversy which has been threshed out sufficiently 'both in the exoteric and in the philosophical treatises'.⁴

The method of arriving at a definition of Purpose is the same in both treatises, but in *E.E.* it is worked out with more consciousness of logic than in *E.N.* For instance in *E.E.* we have the explicit assumption that Purpose is one of two things, either opinion or impulse,⁵ which in *E.N.* we have to extract for ourselves from the seemingly loose assertion—'Those who say that it is appetite or anger or wish or opinion of some kind do not seem to speak rightly'.⁶

The question why we should do what is right is not touched in *E.N.* or *E.E.*; in both it is assumed that *τὸ καλόν* shines by its own light. But while *E.N.* leaves

¹ 1223^a 26. Cp. *E.N.* 1111^b 11.

² 1214^a 30. ^b 5, 1218^b 31-35.

³ *E.E.* 1225^b 22, 23.

⁴ 1214^a 26-30.

⁵ 1217^b 16-23.

⁶ 1111^b 10-12.

the matter so, *E. E.* gives us the explicit declaration that there is no λόγος of the σκοπός,¹ that is, no rational account to be given of an end. It is in fact a question of values. This is what *E. N.* leads up to, but does not say. Aristotle often speaks of λόγος as a faculty which supplies us with ends. Eudemus coming after him is inclined to think that it ought to be confined to means, though in 1229^a 2 he says ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεύει. This latter is the orthodox view, which imports a moral meaning into λόγος, just as a moral meaning was imported into προαίρεσις, so that, strictly speaking, there was no such thing as a bad will (προαίρεσις). When Eudemus in a different context² asserts that 'Virtue is an instrument of the intellect' he has managed by anticipation exactly to reverse the famous saying of Comte that 'The intellect is the servant of the heart'.

§ 7. The *Nicomachean Ethics* might have emanated from a pure intelligence, but there are some touches of personal feeling about Eudemus. He is inclined to Pessimism. There is about him that note of melancholy which seems inseparable from the Asiatic Greek from Homer downwards. He has not got far in his treatise before we find him involved in a discussion of the question—'Is life worth living?' Eudemus, it is a relief to find, has not such a good conceit of himself as most of the Greek philosophers, whose tall talk about the sage seems to have incapacitated them from facing the rather sordid realities of the actual moral life. Eudemus speaks as one who has felt, when he includes the attractions of ignoble pleasures among the things which make it 'better not to be'.³

§ 8. Even with the *Eudemian Ethics* before us it is difficult to pronounce judgement on the literary merits of the writer, so corrupt is the text in many passages. Some parts of the treatise, especially the first book, show that he can write well and clearly; but at the same time there are signs here and there of a certain muddle-headedness, displayed among other things in his lugging in recognized

¹ *E. E.* 1227^b 24, 25.

² 1248^a 29 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον.

³ 1215^b 25, 26.

doctrines of the School in inappropriate places, e. g. the two uses of anything from the *Politics*, when he is discussing the virtue of liberality.¹

The close correspondence in the subject-matter between *E. E.* and *E. N.* is quite in accordance with what we are told by the commentators as to the fidelity of Eudemus to his master's doctrines. We find no deviations in the main outlines, though there are some on minor points, for instance, the writer of *E. E.* deliberately rejects the definition of wit proposed in *E. N.*, which shows that he must have had this work before him.²

On the whole the estimate that we form of this writer is that he is a man of sound judgement, but destitute of originality. Like the writer of *E. N.*, he has passages on Method³ and is frequent in his appeal to Induction.⁴ But personally he is more interested in the form than in the matter of knowledge. He has an unseasonable fondness for definition,⁵ is over-addicted to distinction,⁶ and likes to guard his statements in a way which seems due to long polemical habit.⁷ In one word he is somewhat of a formalist. This is in keeping with the list of works which we have seen ascribed to Eudemus, which deal with Mathematics, Logic, and Diction, with the one exception of his work on Physics.

§ 9. The last point to notice about the writer of *E. E.*, whom we may as well frankly call Eudemus, is his religious tone, which differentiates him from Aristotle as we conceive of him. But the difference seems to be in the tone, not really in the utterance. For perhaps it is not true to say with Grant that Eudemus does not identify *θεωρία* with the highest good. Is not this just what he means by saying that the right limit with regard to health, wealth, friends, and all natural goods is whatever promotes most the contemplation of God? And when he alters his phrase into 'worshipping and contemplating God', we need not

¹ *E. E.* 1231^b 38-^a 9; *Pol.* 1257^a 6-14.

² *E. E.* 1234^a 21; *E. N.* 1128^a 26.

³ 1216^b 26-1217^a 17; 1235^b 12-18.

⁴ 1219^a 1, 1220^a 28, ^b 30, 1248^b 26.

⁵ 1215^a 29-32. ⁶ 1249^b 15.

⁷ 1221^b 4-7.

suppose that by 'worshipping' he means a Semitic prostration of the body, but rather the earnest prosecution by the mind of the search for truth. That Eudemus' conception of the divine nature was really no less abstract than that of Aristotle seems to follow from the hint which he throws out in passing that the things which admit not of change may perhaps be the highest in their nature.¹

§ 10. We come now to the vexed question of the three disputed books. But let it be observed to begin with that the question is not one of any great importance. For in any case the doctrine is Aristotle's. The point in dispute is whether the three books come directly from the hand that wrote the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which we assume to be that of Aristotle himself, or indirectly through the most faithful of his followers, Eudemus.

§ 11. Neither the *Nicomachean* nor the *Eudemian Ethics*² would be complete without some treatment of the queen of virtues, Justice, of the Intellectual Virtues, or of that half-way house on the road to virtue, which is known as Self-control. There are therefore two gaps which have been filled up by the same three books. But if on inquiry it should turn out that these books fit into one of the gaps more neatly than into the other, it will be reasonable to conclude that that is the hole for which they were originally intended.

§ 12. Now if these books be assigned to *E. N.*, we have on the one hand two treatments of Pleasure in the same volume³ which entirely ignore each other's presence, and on the other no treatment of Pleasure by Eudemus, though that is a subject on the importance of which he is specially insistent. This argument has authority as well as reason to support it. Aspasius ascribed the treatment of Pleasure in Book VII to Eudemus on the ground that Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* speaks as though he had never yet said anything on the subject.⁴ The double treatment of

¹ 1217^a 32-34.

² By *E. N.* will now be meant *Ethica Nicomachea* i-iv, viii-x, and by *E. E. Ethica Eudemia* i-iii, vii, viii.

³ *E. N.* 1152^b 1-1154^b 31, 1172^a 16-1176^a 29.

⁴ Aspasius on *E. N.* vii. 14, p. 151, ll. 21-26.

Pleasure is a difficulty, or rather an impossibility, on the hypothesis of Aristotelian authorship of the doubtful books, whereas on the hypothesis of Eudemean authorship things fall into their place. We have, as might be expected, a treatment of pleasure from the hand of Aristotle himself and another in close imitation of it from Eudemus.

§ 13. Another argument which certainly carries weight is that in the summary which is given at the beginning of the ninth chapter of Book X the writer enumerates the topics of *E.N.*, but ignores the contents of the doubtful books, Pleasure alone excepted. 'Having therefore' the passage runs, 'said enough in outline about these things (i. e. *θεωρία*), and about the virtues, and further about friendship and pleasure, are we to suppose that our purpose is accomplished?' Here we seem to have Aristotle himself telling us what were originally the exact contents of *E.N.*

§ 14. The mathematical character of Book V seems in favour of Eudemean authorship, though Professor Burnet gives this argument a curious twist the other way. He says in effect¹ that the fifth book must be by Aristotle, because it is so bad. 'Mathematics', he tells us, 'was just the one province of human knowledge in which Aristotle did not show himself a master, while Eudemus was one of the foremost mathematicians of an age in which that science made more progress than it ever did again till the seventeenth century.' But is not this reducible to the fact that Eudemus wrote on mathematics? And have we independent evidence that Aristotle was weak in this department?

§ 15. One obvious line of argument as to the authorship of the disputed books is to inquire whether there are any differences of doctrine between them and *E.N.* or *E.E.* It would be natural to assign the three books to that treatise with which they are least in disagreement.

Now the writer of Book V speaks of actions due to anger as being done knowingly, whereas in *E.N.* we are told that they are not.²

Again in Book VII it is proved that incontinence of

¹ Introd. pp. xiii, xiv.

² v. 8 § 8, 1135^b 20: *E.N.* iii. 1 § 14, 1110^b 27.

anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of appetite.¹ But in *E.N.* it is laid down that it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, and that virtue is always concerned with the more difficult,² whence it follows that incontinence of anger is more disgraceful than incontinence of appetite.

Similarly in Book VII we have the statement that continence or self-control is more choiceworthy than endurance.³ Now endurance consists in resisting pain and self-control in abstaining from pleasure; and we are told in *E.N.* that it is more difficult to resist pain than to abstain from pleasure;⁴ whence it follows, on the principle of the more difficult being the more virtuous, that endurance is more choiceworthy than self-control.

§ 16. Another line of argument which naturally presents itself is that based on references. But here the ground is a quagmire. For the works ascribed to Aristotle have been as 'heavily edited' as the Sacred Books of the Jews. Nevertheless we must try to see in what direction this argument points. There are three questions which present themselves.

1. Are there references in *E.N.* to the doubtful books?
2. Are there references in *E.E.* to the doubtful books?
3. Do the references in the doubtful books point rather to a connexion with *E.N.* or with *E.E.*?

1. In *E.N.* ii. 7 § 16, 1108^b 5-10 there is an anticipation of Books V and VI. But it is singularly out of place and is for well-known reasons open to the gravest suspicion on the score of genuineness.

Again in *E.N.* iv. 9 § 8, 1128^b 33-35 there is an anticipation of Books VII and V in a tag appended to the treatment of Shame.

Further *E.N.* x. 6 § 1, 1176^a 30, 31, like *E.N.* x. 9 § 1, 1179^a 33, 34, which has been already spoken of, is a good summary of the contents of *E.N.* minus the doubtful books. We may notice that in both these passages pleasure is mentioned *after* friendship.

¹ vii. 6 §§ 1-5, 1149^a 24-^b 25.

³ vii. 7 § 4, 1150^a 36.

² ii. 3 § 10, 1105^a 7-9.

⁴ iii. 9 § 2, 1117^a 34, 35.

2. In *E. E.* 1216^a 37 Eudemus promises to inquire later into pleasure, which is done in Book VII, while the subject is again touched on in *E. E.* 1249^a 17-20.

In *E. E.* 1218^b 16 Eudemus makes a promise which is considered by Fischer and Fritzsche to be fulfilled in Book VI. 1141^b 23.

E. E. 1227^a 2, 3 is a reference to Book V. 8 § 1, 1135^a 15-36^a 9.

E. E. 1227^b 16 contains a promise which is fulfilled in Book VI. See especially 1144^a 35.

E. E. 1231^b 2-4 contains a promise which may be regarded as fulfilled in vii. 4, though some doubt this.

E. E. 1234^a 28. The promise here made is fulfilled in vi. 13 § 1, 1144^b 1-17.

E. E. 1234^b 14 is a transition formula to Book V, like that in *E. N.* 1128^a 35 with only the difference of $\eta\delta\eta$ for $\nu\hat{\nu}\nu$.

E. E. 1249^a 17 looks back on Pleasure as a subject treated of. But where is this done, if we refuse to Eudemus the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII?

It will be seen from the above that the references, actual or possible, in *E. E.* to the doubtful books are much more numerous than those in *E. N.* They also come in much more naturally.

Now let us shift our point of view and see how things look from the other side. As *E. E.* is so like *E. N.* there will naturally be many references which are satisfied by either treatise.

v. 1 § 2, 1129^a 5, 6. A reference to previous method, which is much the same in both.

v. 4 § 6, 1132^a 17. There is mention here of 'gain' and 'loss', 'between which the equal is, as we found ($\hat{\eta}\nu$), a mean.' There is nothing in *E. N.* for this to refer to, but we find it in *E. E.* 1221^a 4, 23.

v. 7 § 7, 1135^a 15. This is not satisfied by either treatise.

v. 8 § 3, 1135^a 23-25. 'I call that voluntary, as has been said before.' The substance of the definition here given is to be found in *E. N.* iii. 1 § 20, 1111^a 23, 24, but the language is rather that of *E. E.* ii. 9 § 2, 1225^b 8, 9.

vii. 1 § 4, 1145^a 34. 'And about Vice we have spoken previously' (in both treatises).

vii. 2 § 5, 1146^a 8. The previous passage here referred to must be vi. 8 §§ 8, 9, 1142^a 25-30. But all that this goes to show is that Books VI and VII are by the same writer.

vii. 4 § 2, 1147^b 28. Neutral.

vii. 7 § 1, 1150^a 11. Neutral.

§ 17. We now come to the argument from language.

Grant used the word *ōpos* as a striking instance of 'the agreement of philosophical phraseology between the Disputed Books and the *Eudemian Ethics*. In the sense of 'standard' or 'determining principle' this word occurs three times in these books.¹ It is not to be found in *E. N.*,² but it is used by Eudemus. But we must not insist very strongly on this argument, for, if pressed, it would prove the Eudemian authorship of the *Politics*, in which this use of *ōpos* abounds.³

The way of speaking of the goods of fortune as being *ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά*, which presents itself in the fifth book,⁴ is not to be found in *E. N.*, but reappears at the end of *E. E.*⁵

Fritzsche noted the use of the word *μεταμελητικός* in the disputed books⁶ as a sign of Eudemian authorship. It occurs in *E. E.* 1240^b 23, but not in *E. N.*

In vi. 12 § 5, 1144^a 5 we find the phrase *τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς*, which Professor Stewart notices does not occur in *E. N.*, but is used by Eudemus.⁷

Professor Stewart has also pointed out that the peculiar phrase *ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνειν*, which appears in vii. 9 § 2, 1151^b 11 is to be found also in *E. E.* 1231^a 29.

There is hardly anything more distinctive of Eudemus than his fondness for the formula *ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ*.⁸

¹ vi. 1 § 1, 1138^b 23, vi. 1 § 3, 1138^b 34, vii. 13 § 4, 1153^b 25.

² *E. N.* i. 7 § 7, 1097^b 12 is different.

³ For contending views on this subject see Grant, Essay I, pp. 60, 61 Burnet, pp. 250, 251.

⁴ v. 1 § 9, 1129^b 3, v. 6 § 6, 1134^b 4, v. 9 § 17 1137^a 26.

⁵ 1249^b 25. See Grant, Essay I, p. 62.

⁶ vii. 7 § 2, 1150^a 21, vii. 8 § 1 (*bis*), 1150^b 29, 30.

⁷ *E. E.* ii. 1 § 14, 1219^b 21.

⁸ *E. E.* 1216^b 22, 23, 1217^a 19, 1220^a 16, 17, 1249^b 6.

Now in vi. i § 2, 1138^b 26 we find the same formula, which nowhere occurs in *E. N.*

It certainly looks as if the phrase ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις in v. 5 § 8 came from the same hand as the words κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν in *E. E.* 1242^b 16. But the latter were written by the mathematician Eudemus. Therefore it is likely that the former were so also.

In v. 8 § 3, 1135^a 27 we find the words ὥσπερ εἰ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον. In *E. E.* 1224^b 13 we find them again with the substitution of τινά for ἕτερον.

In Book VII¹ there is a contrast drawn between the θρασύς and the θαρραλέος, where θαρραλέος as a substitute for ἀνδρείος comes as rather a surprise upon the reader familiar with *E. N.*, but it fits in nicely with the distinction drawn by Eudemus between θάρσος as a good quality and θράσος as a bad.²

εὐθύς in the sense of *ipso facto* occurs in the disputed books³ and in *E. E.*,⁴ but not in *E. N.*

In *E. N.* the abstract noun used as the contrary of πραότης is ὀργιλότης;⁵ that used in *E. E.* is χαλεπότης.⁶ In the disputed books χαλεπότης is used.⁷

In vi. i § 14, 1129^b 22 μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν are what occur to the writer as attributes of the πρᾶος. This would have a special appropriateness, if it came from the same writer who made the πλήκτης καὶ λοιδορητικός into a species co-ordinate with the ὀξύθυμος, χαλεπός, and πικρός,⁸ to which species there is nothing to correspond in *E. N.*

The use of the neuter plural with a plural verb is not, I believe, to be found in *E. N.* It appears, however, in the disputed books and also in *E. E.*⁹

Lastly the use of the relative for the interrogative in v. 8 § 3, 1135^a 25 tallies with the practice of *E. E.*, and not with that of *E. N.*¹⁰

¹ vii. 9 § 2, 1151^b 7, 8.

³ v. 10 § 4, 1137^b 19, vi. 5 § 6, 1140^b 17.

⁶ 1108^a 7, 1125^b 29.

⁷ v. 2 § 2, 1130^a 18, vii. 5 § 5, 1149^a 6, vii. 6 § 2, 1149^b 7.

⁸ *E. E.* ii. 3 § 12, 1221^b 14.

⁹ v. 4 § 2, 1131^b 30: *E. E.* 1231^b 35, 1232^a 10. It is common in the *Metaphysics*.

¹⁰ *E. E.* 1225^b 2, 5: *E. N.* iii. 1 § 16, 1111^a 3-5.

² *E. E.* 1234^b 12.

⁴ 1237^a 28.

⁶ 1231^b 6.

§ 18. So far everything seems to go in favour of assigning the disputed books to *E.E.* But there is evidence from the *Politics*, which must be taken account of. The writer of that treatise, who has always been regarded as Aristotle himself, refers to the *Ethics* with all the modesty of an author.¹ In this of course there is nothing to surprise us. But out of six references in the *Politics* to the *Ethics* three are to Book V. We seem therefore to have the warrant of Aristotle himself for ascribing this book to him. And his it undoubtedly is, so far as the thought goes. Even the illustrations come from him. For instance an example given of the conventionally just is the hero-worship paid to Brasidas at Amphipolis. How natural this is in the mouth of Aristotle himself, who had lived near the place! But would it have occurred to Eudemus of Rhodes?

While, however, we regard Book V, and with it Books VI and VII, as the genuine outcome of the mind of Aristotle, there is no need to suppose that, in the form in which we have these books, they were written by him. The references in the *Politics* are not necessarily to a written work. They may be only to the author's lectures on Ethics. Part of these lectures have come down to us in the written form into which they were put either by Aristotle himself or possibly by his son. But part we have only as worked up by Eudemus and adjusted to his own treatise. That seems to be all that can be said with safety.

§ 19. The *Magna Moralia* justifies its name by its containing in a succinct form the whole course of Aristotle's lectures on Ethics, both what we get from *E.N.* and what we get from *E.E.*, and further what is contained in the doubtful books. At starting we find the writer distinguishing like Eudemus between the two questions of what virtue is and from what it comes, while towards the end he brings in the Eudemian discussion of Good Luck² and that on Nobility and Goodness,³ which have no counterparts in

¹ *Pol.* iv. 11 § 3, 1295^a 37, vii. 13 § 5, 1332^a 8.

² *M. M.* ii. 8 = *E. E.* viii. 14.

³ *M. M.* ii. 9 = *E. E.* viii. 15, 1248^b 8-49^a 16.

E. N. The writer's treatment of pleasure displays affinity both with that of Book VII and that of *E. N.* x. How close is the correspondence between *M. M.* and *E. N.* may be illustrated by the following striking instance. In *E. N.* 1109^a 15, 16 it is written—'and so we are more prone to intemperance than to sobriety' (κοσμιότητα). Here the natural word to employ would be 'stolidity' (ἀναισθησία)¹ which is, in fact, employed by the Paraphrast, but which Aristotle seems to have avoided because of its being unusual,² even at the cost of a slight impropriety; but when the writer of the *Magna Moralia* comes to the same subject we find him also using 'sobriety' instead of 'stolidity'.

§ 20. Who was this writer? He pronounces judgement in the first person as to what 'appears to me' (1181^b 28); he poses as the representative of the school (1198^a 20); and he claims to have written the *Analytics* (1201^b 25). This last pretension is peculiarly inconvenient. Aristotle's *Analytics* we know, and Eudemus' *Analytics* we know of: but who is this? We seem to be reduced to this alternative. Either we have here Aristotle himself, as Schleiermacher thought (but against this there are at all events linguistic objections), or else we have some student who has attended the whole course of lectures on Ethics, and written them out as coming from the Master. One thing seems certain, namely, that there is no allusion in the treatise which might not well have been made by Aristotle. Mention is made of Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea Pontica, in whom Aristotle would have a special interest, as he had, like Aristotle himself, been a pupil of Plato's. The transformation of one whom he probably knew personally from 'a most generous, kind, and gentle student', such as he is described by Isocrates (423 d) as being, into a monster of iniquity³ must have presented a curious psychological problem to the philosopher. Clearchus was assassinated in B.C. 353, when Aristotle himself would have just turned

¹ See *E. N.* 1109^a 4, 1119^a 7.

² See *E. N.* ii. 7 § 3, 1107^b 7, 8.

³ See Justin xvi. 4 § 5.

thirty. Eight years later, in B.C. 345, there occurred an event which Aristotle was not likely to forget, namely, the treacherous seizure of his friend Hermeias, the autocrat of Atarneus, and his delivery to Artaxerxes, who put him to death. The Greek who perpetrated this crime was Mentor, the very person who is selected by the writer as an illustration of the man who is clever, but not wise (1197^a 21). The last historical event alluded to is the death of Darius in B.C. 330, when Aristotle was 54 years old. We may notice that the writer of *M. M.* agrees with Eudemus in taking the Indians instead of the Scythians¹ as the type of a far-away people, with whom we have no practical concern. The exploits of Alexander in India would make it extremely appropriate for Aristotle himself to say—'For we often think about things in India, but it does not follow that we purpose them' (1189^a 20).

§ 21. As regards the subject-matter of *M. M.* the most important point to notice is that here we get the crowning word of Peripatetic Ethics, for which we wait in vain in *E. N.* or even in *E. E.*—'Speaking generally, it is not the case, as the rest of the world think, that reason is the principle of and guide to virtue, but rather the feelings.'² It has been thought that 'the rest of the world' (*οἱ ἄλλοι*) here is meant for the Stoics, but they only carried on the doctrine of Plato and Speusippus. Professor Burnet, rightly, I think, declares that the *Magna Moralia* 'shows no trace of Stoic influence'.

On the subject of the self-contemplation of God the writer of *M. M.* dissents both from Aristotle and Eudemus; but he leaves the question undetermined.³

In one passage of this treatise⁴ we find the statement that intellectual virtue is not praised. This, though it is in accordance with modern ideas, contradicts both *E. N.*⁵ and *E. E.*⁶ It is, however, itself contradicted in another passage.⁷

The poison case in the Areopagus, which is obscure in

¹ *M. M.* 1189^a 20: *E. E.* 1226^a 29: *E. N.* 1112^a 28.

² 1206^b 17-19.

³ 1212^b 37-1213^a 7.

⁴ 1185^b 9.

⁵ i. 13 § 20, 1103^a 8.

⁶ ii. i. § 18, 1220^a 5.

⁷ 1197^a 17.

*E. E.*¹ and which escaped notice altogether in *E. N.*, until it was revealed by Bernays and by Bywater's text,² comes out clearly in *M. M.*

The meaning put upon *ἐνέργεια* by this writer, namely, that it implies *ὁρμή*,³ is confined to himself.

§ 22. Certain peculiarities of diction have been noticed in *M. M.*, such as the phrase *τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν*,⁴ the use of *ἐπιστήμη* for *τέχνη*, of *τὸ ὅλον* in an adverbial sense for *ὅλως*, and above all the persistent employment of *ὑπέρ* for *περί*.⁵ Further there are forty words in *M. M.* which occur neither in *E. N.* nor *E. E.* Lastly the utmost laxity is displayed as to the rule of syntax that a neuter plural should have its verb in the singular.

§ 23. The tract on Virtues and Vices, which closes the ethical works attributed to Aristotle, appears to be later than his time. The elaborate way in which the virtues and vices are divided and subdivided reminds one of Stoic work, which the writer may have wished to rival. But perhaps the tract may be later still. For the fixed place assigned to daemons, as intermediate between gods and men,⁶ is suggestive of neo-Platonic times, while the eclectic nature of the work seems to point to the same period of the blending of philosophic brands.

Assuming, to start with, Plato's threefold division of the soul, the writer makes Wisdom the virtue of the rational part, Gentleness and Courage those of the passionate part, and Temperance and Self-restraint those of the appetitive part. Justice, Liberality and Magnanimity are declared to be virtues of the whole soul. The Vices are arranged on precisely parallel lines. After the Virtues and Vices have been duly defined we have a statement of the characteristics and concomitants of both, which occupies most of the treatise. The conclusion consists in a brief view of the general effect of virtue. The treatment is not purely Peripatetic. There is not a word about the Doctrine of

¹ 1225^b 5.

² *E. N.* iii. 1 § 17, 1111^a 14.

³ 1185^a 28.

⁴ 1183^a 6-1185^a 1.

⁵ This last usage appears as early as Plato, *Apol.* 39 e.

⁶ 1250^b 20, 1251^a 31.

the Mean. The assignment of the two virtues of Gentleness and Courage to the passionate part of the soul carries us back to Plato with his comparison of the Guardians to dogs. Self-restraint is exalted into a virtue in spite of Aristotle's regarding it as a mixed state. There is no mention of the Aristotelian virtue of Magnificence, but, by way of compensation, the liberal man has absorbed into himself some of the attributes of the magnificent man.¹

¹ 1250^b 28-31.